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Summary findings
Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new  on the credibility of exchange rate pegs. Conversely,
hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central  Keefer and Stasavage argue that central bank
bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the  independence does not solve problems of commitment
context of different institutions and different degrees of  that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about
citizen information about government policies.  the contribution  of government policy to inflation.
Theory provides strong reason to believe that while  Exchange rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems.
central bank independence will prove more effective as a  The authors present extensive evidence from cross-
commitment mechanism in countries where multiple  country tests using newly developed data that provide
players in government have veto power (checks and  strong support for their propositions.
balances), the number of veto players will have no effect
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The  literature  on positive  models  of monetary  policy  has focused  on the fundamental
difficulty  that governments  can encounter  in establishing  the credibility  of their  policy
commitments.  The problem  arises  when  governments  have  an incentive  to increase  the rate
of inflation  ex  post,  once  the public  has  taken  actions  such  as signing  long-term  wage
contracts.  This  time consistency  problem  is further  complicated  by  the presence  of two  types
of private  information.  First,  the  public  may  be unsure  of the preferences  of government
decisions  makers  with  regard  to the short-term  tradeoffs  between  inflation  and  output.
Second,  the public  cannot  perfectly  observe  a government's  forecasts  for variables  such  as
money  demand,  and as  a result  may  have  difficulty  in distinguishing  between  inflation
deliberately  generated  by government  and  inflation  caused  by exogenous  shocks.
Considerable  research  has pointed  to central  bank  independence  and  exchange  rate  pegs  as
irnportant  instruments  which  governments  can  use to establish  policy  credibility.  For
exarnple,  in a canonical  contribution,  Rogoff  (1985)  demonstrates  that  delegation  to an
independent  central  bank  might  solve  the  time  consistency  problem  and  be welfare-
improving.
The puzzle  confronting  both  the central  bank  and  exchange  rate  peg  solutions  to
credibility  problems  is  the following.  In the case  of the time  consistency  problem  with
complete  information,  why  is  it more  costly  for politicians  to revoke  central  bank
independence  or fixed  exchange  rates  than  to renege  on other  policy  commitments  such  as  a
simple  pledge  to maintain  a specific  rate  of money  growth? The effect  of  these  institutions
on the time  consistency  problem  with  private  information  raises  a similar  puzzle:  why  are
government  attempts  to revoke  central  bank  independence  or fixed  exchange  rates  momisibl
than  government  failures  to pursue  low  inflation?
2In this paper,  we use  theory  and  evidence  to demonstrate  that  the  effectiveness  of
central  bank  independence  in solving  the complete  information  time  consistency  problem
depends  on the structure  of a country's  political  institutions,  and  in particular  on the number
of veto  players  in government.  This  argument  follows  earlier  contributions  by Lohmann
(1998),  Moser  (1999)  and  ourselves  (Keefer  and  Stasavage  2000).  However,  we suggest  that
the  effectiveness  of exchange  rate  pegs  in solving  the complete  information  time  consistency
problem  does  not  increase  with  the number  of  veto  players  in government.  We  also  consider
whether  and  how  exchange  rate  pegs  and  independent  central  banks  have  a significant  effect
on the private  information  time  consistency  problem.  Here  we follow  arguments  made  by
Canavan  and  Tommasi  (1997)  and  by Herrendorf  (1998),  who  suggest  that  exchange  rate
pegs  have  a larger  anti-inflationary  effect,  the more  the public  is  uncertain  whether  observed
inflation  is due  to deliberate  government  action. In contrast,  central  bank  independence  is
not more  effective  as a commnitment  device  under  these  same  conditions  of uncertainty.1
Our empirical  results  support  the proposition  that central  bank  independence  is more
likely  to reduce  inflation  in institutional  contexts  where  there  are  multiple  veto  players  in
government.  In contrast,  checks  and  balances  have  a negative  or insignificant  effect  on the
efficacy  with  which  exchange  rate  pegs  reduce  inflation  expectations.  On the other  hand,  our
tests  support  the view  that the anti-inflationary  effect  of exchange  rate  pegs  increases
significantly  in contexts  where  it is  difficult  for the public  to distinguish  between  inflation  that
results  from  deliberate  government  policy  choices  and  inflation  which  results  from  exogenous
shocks  to the economy.  Finally,  we demonstrate  that our results  are  robust  to alternative
specifications  emphasizing  the effect  of democratic  institutions  more  generally  on monetary
commitments.  These  results  are  general:  we obtain  them  using  a sample  that  includes  both
1 On the idea  that exchange  rate pegs provide  a more transparent form of commitment  see also Broz (1999).
3developed  and developing  countries  (78  in total) over the period from 1975  to 1994.
Our investigation  has direct  implications  for the question  posed by Bernhard,  Broz
and Clark (2000): if commitment  mechanisms  such as central  bank independence  and fixed
exchange  rate pegs unambiguously  improve general  welfare,  why do all countries  not adopt
them? 2 One possible answer  is that the social  welfare  function  assumed  in the literature
incompletely  reflects the social  tradeoffs  between  inflation  and economic  growth. Thus
institutional  reforms such as central  bank independence  may not unambiguously  improve
social  welfare. The institutional  and information  hypotheses  that we analyze  offer a different
answer  to the question that retains  the economic  assumptions  of existing  positive  models  of
monetary  policy: some countries  do not successfully  adopt these mechanisms  simply  because
doing so would have little effect on policy  outcomes.
The remainder  of the paper  is organized  as follows. We first consider  the conditions
under which central  banks and exchange  rate pegs  will  prevent governments  from reneging
on their inflation  commitments  in a world of complete  information. We then consider  the
conditions  under which these  two instruments  constitute  better signals  of the preferences  of
policy  makers  than do the underlying  policies  enacted  by policy  makers. The influence  of
political  institutions  is analyzed  in both sections. We then present cross-country  empirical
tests of several  propositions. Section  5 then considers  robustness  issues. Section  6
concludes.
2.  Political institutions and monetary commitments
The basic  credibility  problem  in monetary policy  involves  the incentive  for
governments  to take advantage  of fixed  inflation  expectations  of private actors in order to
2 See also Bemhard (1998),  Maxfield  (1997),  (Broz,  1999),  Clark and Maxfield  (1997),  and Bernhard and Leblang
(1999)
4create  a temporary growth spurt  through an increase  in the money  supply. The problem
emerges  from the simple  framework  introduced by Barro and Gordon (1983a).
Governments  minimize  a loss  function given  by
(1)  LG =Ir  + 2IbG(y,  -y')2  with  respect  to or,  where
2  2
(2)  y,=  ,-  ' + 
Output is a function of 7r', expected  inflation,  and a supply  shock,  and y is desired  output.
The term bG is the relative  weight  which the government  attaches  to departures  from the
desired  rate of output relative  to departures  from the desired  rate of inflation. Private  actors
first build expected  inflation  into their long term contracts,  prior to observing  either the
supply  shock or government  policy  actions,  then the supply  shock is realized,  and then the
government  sets actual  inflation. Private actors  set their inflation  expectations  understanding
that, after the shock is realized,  government  has an incentive  to allow  inflation  greater  than
expected  inflation,  in order to achieve  a temporary boost in output. Anticipating  this, private
actors  build an inflation  bias into their contracts,  which would be zero if governments  could
credibly  commit not to initiate  an inflation  "surprise". The amount  of the bias is bGy  and
final  inflation  is given  by this bias and an adjustment  to the supply  shock,  or
(3)  f = bGy  -1  bG  E
1± bG
This is the credibility  problem of governments  operating  under complete  information.
This section develops  several  propositions about the conditions  under which central  banks
and exchange  rate pegs reduce  the inflation  bias  that emerges  from this credibility  problem.
Central  bank independence  and credibility  witb complete  information
Establishing  an independent  central  bank reduces  the inflation  bias if central bankers
5can act  with  full  autonomy,  that  is without  fear  of override,  and  if their  preference  parameter
bc,  is less  than bG.  The crucial  implicit  assumption  in contributions  such  as Rogoffs  (1985)  is
that  the central  bank  acts  with  irreversible,  full  autonomy.  If, however,  central  bank  decisions
are  no more  difficult  for political  actors  to override  than  economic  policies  themselves,
independent  central  banks  may  do little  to prevent  expost  reneging  on inflation  commitments.
Instead  of solving  the time  consistency  problem,  central  bank  independence  would  merely
displace  it, as governments  would  have  an incentive  to first  announce  central  bank
independence  and  subsequently  renege  on this  commitment.
Central  bank  independence  could  be protected  from  override  by constitutional
guarantees.  The  precise  effect  of constitutional  guarantees  is clarified  by Lohmann  (1998):
legal  central  bank  independence  is likely  to make  a difference  for policy  outcomes  if a larger
number  of veto  players  is required  to revise  a central  bank's  statute  than  would  be  required  to
make  a change  in monetary  policy  if the government  had  regained  discretionary  control  over
policy. 3 For example,  if monetary  policy  under  discretion  were  set  by  the executive  alone,  but
revisions  of the central  bank  charter  required  the agreement  of both the executive  and  the
legislature,  delegation  to an independent  central  bank  could  increase  the credibility  of
monetary  policy. 4
However,  it is not evident  in practice  that a greater  number of veto players  is required
to consent  to changes  in a central  bank charter than is required  to change  monetary policy  in
the absence of an independent  central bank.  The central  bank charters of most countries  are
laws  voted by legislatures  rather than inscribed  in constitutions;  thus central  banks are  no less
3 More  generally,  comparative  research  on political  institutions  and  policy  making  has  demonstrated  that  it is
more  difficult  to pass  laws  in  countries  where  decision  making  is  divided  between  multiple  veto  players,  whether
a separate  executive  and  legislature  in the case  of presidential  systems,  or multiple  parties  within  a coalition
government  within  parliamentaty  systems  (for  a recent  comprehensive  discussion,  see  Tsebelis  1999).
4 Whether  credibility  actually  increases  also  depends  on the preferences  of the different  veto  playems
6vulnerable,  in principle,  to having  their  actions  or independence  overturned  by  political
authorities  than  are  other  types  of legislation. 5
One  possible  response  to this argument  is  to observe  that only  the executive  has full
control  of monetary  policy  if there  has been  no decision  to delegate.  However,  this  is not
always  accurate.  For example,  in a coalition  govermnent,  the party  controlling  the finance
ministry  may  nominally  have  full  control  of monetary  policy,  but  in practice  other  coalition
members  can  threaten  to leave  the coalition  when  confronted  with finance  ministry  actions  to
which  they  are strongly  opposed.  Likewise,  in a presidential  system  the legislature  also  exerts
influence  on monetary  policy  making  to the extent  there  are  spillovers  from  fiscal  policy  to
monetary  policy.  Thus,  in practice  a similar  number  of veto  players  may  be required  to
consent  to changes  in central  bank  laws  as  would  be required  to consent  to changes  in
monetary  policy  in the absence  of an independent  central  bank.
The important  question  that remains,  therefore,  is  how  delegation  of policy  making
authority  to an independent  agency  can  make  a difference  for policy  when  the number  of
veto  players  required  to overturn  delegation  and  to change  monetary  policy  is the same.
Moser  (1999)  provides  one  answer  to this question.  He assumes  that under  checks  and
balances,  with  no delegation,  policy  outcomes  are  the result  of a simple  bargain  between  the
veto  players,  and  he then  shows  that delegation  by multiple  political  actors  can  lead  to lower
inflation  expectations  than  would  prevail  in the absence  of an independent  central  bank.
Keefer  and Stasavage  (2000)  compare  the effects  of delegation  under  a richer  variety
of institutional  arrangements,  considering  several  agenda-setting  possibilities  that might
operate  under  checks  and balances.  We find  that  the effects  of delegation  are  highly  sensitive
5 Moreover,  as the literature  on legislative  control of bureaucratic  institutions  (e.g.,  Weingast  and Moran, 1983)
emphasizes,  failure  to observe frequent changes  in central  bank statutes  is an unreliable  indicator  of
independence,  since  if the threat of a statutory  revision is credible,  central banks  will  typically  modify  their
7to the institutional  rules. The  effect  of central  bank  independence  rises  with  the extent  to
which  veto  player  preferences  diverge;  central  bank  independence  has  a small  effect  on
inflation  expectations  when  the more  inflation-averse  veto  player  is the agenda  setter;  and  its
effect  is  greatest  when  the less  inflation-averse  veto  player  exercises  agenda  control.
The model  developed  in Keefer  and Stasavage  (2000)  adds  a second  government
decision  maker  to the classic  Barro-Gordon  model,  and then  compares  the outcome  under
two  government  decision  makers  to the outcome  when  there is delegation  to an independent
central  bank.  As  in Barro-Gordon,  private  sector  actors  establish  inflation  expectations  and
embed  them  in long  term  contracts.  A random  supply  shock  occurs  and  political  decision
makers  fix  inflation.  If they  cannot  agree  on a new  inflation  policy,  expected  inflation  (the
price  increases  written  into long  terms  contracts)  becomes  actual  inflation.
The policy  they  select  depends  on whether  the more  or less  inflation-averse  political
actor  has  agenda  control,  or whether  neither  does. It also  depends  on whether  expected
inflation  is higher  than  the preferred  inflation  outcome  of the less  inflation-averse  political
actor,  lower  than  the preferred  inflation  of  the most inflation-averse  actor,  or between  the
two,  each  case  resulting  in the two  actors  agreeing  to a different  inflation  outcome. 6
The  introduction  of the independent  central  bank  effectively  assigns  agenda-setting
power  to the independent  central  bank7 The private  actors  set  expected  inflation,  the shock
is realized,  and  the central  bank  fixes  inflation.  The  political  actors  then  decide  whether  to
override  the bank  (again,  both  must  agree);  if an override  occurs,  monetary  policy  is set  by the
two  political  actors  as  if there  were  no central  bank.
policies  to avoid revision.
6 Politicians  who place  a non-zero  weight on stabilizing  output wil prefer to react to a negative  supply  shock by
increasing  the rate of inflation.
7 The relationship  between  political  actors and central  bank therefore reflects the logic  of 'agency drift' models
of legislative  control over bureaucratic  institutions  (McCubbins,  Noll and Weingast  1989,  1987). See  also
8In the presence  of checks  and  balances,  the key  difference  between  monetary  policy
made  under  discretion  (without  CBI)  and  monetary  policy  made  under  delegation  (CBI)  is
that  the default  or reservation  outcome  changes  - the outcome  which  prevails  if veto  players
are  unable  to agree  on a change  in policy  is  different  under  discretion  than  under  CBI. Under
discretion,  the reservation  outcome  is the rate  of inflation  which  results  from  the price
increases  written  into  wage  contracts  by  the  private  sector. If the realization  of the supply
shock  is such  that one  veto  player  would  prefer  to inflate,  while  another  would  not, as  in
Figure  1 below,  then neither  veto  player  is able  to improve  on the reservation  outcome
without  making  the other  worse  off. The reservation  outcome  will  be  the final  rate  of
inflation.
Under  delegation,  in contrast,  if veto  players  are  unable  to agree  to override  the
central  bank,  the rate  of inflation  that  prevails  is  that chosen  by  the central  bank- Knowing
this,  the central  bank  has an incentive  to choose  a rate  of inflation  which  is  override-proof.
Assuming  the central  bank  is  more  averse  than  any  veto  player,  then  it will  choose  an inflation
outcome  which  leaves  the most  inflation-averse  political  decision  maker  no worse  off  than if
the two  veto  players  overrode  the central  bank  and  agreed  on a new  rate  of inflation.
Figure  1  demonstrates  this  logic.  The "Inflation  without  CBI"  outcome  is the
outcome  that  prevails  either  in the absence  of a central  bank,  or if the political  actors  override
the central  banker.  The central  bank  therefore  chooses  "inflation  with  CBI",  an inflation
level  that  is as  no further  from Veto  Player  i's preferred  inflation  outcome  than  is "inflation
without  CBI",  giving  veto  player  1  no incentive  to agree  to override  the central  bank's
decision  - and  generating  lower  expected  inflation  than  would  otherwise  have  prevailed.
Epstein and OHalloran (1999)
9Figure 1: Reservation  outcomes  with and without  central  bank  independence
central  bank  veto  player  1  veto player  2
preferred  outcome  preferred  outcome  preferred  outcome
lower  inflation  higher  infation
inflation  inflation
with  CBI  without  CBI
Keefer and Stasavage  (2000)  show that, as long as the central  banker  has more
"conservative"  inflation  preferences  than any political  decision  maker,  the rate of inflation  is
unambiguously  lower when monetary  policy  is delegated  to a central  bank, although,  as was
earlier  made clear,  the magnitude  of this effect varies  greatly  with the identity  of the agenda
setter and the extent of polarization  of the political  actors.
In the second half of the paper,  we present  tests of the following  proposition  that
emerges  from this discussion. 8
Proposition 1:  Central bank independence is more effective as an anti-inflationary
device when there are multiple veto players in government
Checks and balances and exchange rate pegs
Exchange  rate pegs are  widely  believed  to serve as a form of credible  commitment,
because  adopting  a peg reduces  the possibility  for a government  to conduct an independent
monetary  policy. As is well-known,  if foreign  assets  are perfectly  substitutable  for domestic
assets,  a country's  money supply  -and hence  its inflation  rate - are  exogenously  determined.
All a government  need do to establish  such a peg is to declare  that it is willing  to sell  foreign
currency  for domestic  currency  at a fixed  rate. If private actors believed  that the exchange
8 In our empirical  tests we assume,  as is conventional,  that central  bankers  on average  have conservative
10rate  peg  is immutable,  their  domestic  inflation  expectations  would  then  simply  equal  expected
world  inflation.  Given  the standard  Barro-Gordon  loss  function,  however,  government
decision  makers  have  an expost  incentive  to devalue  - to abandon  the peg  - in order  to
generate  a higher  rate  of inflation.
The literature  has suggested  that exchange  rate  pegs  may  nonetheless  increase
monetary  policy  credibility  if devaluation  imposes  additional  political  costs  on governments.
These  costs  are  generally  modeled  with  an exogenous  parameter  C which  is added  to the
Barro-Gordon  loss  function  minimized  by government  decision  makers  (as  in Obstfeld,
1996).9
(4)  1~2  12G  Y ()  LG =-2 r  +-2bG  (y,-_/F) 2 +C(Xr)
This solution  parallels  the assumption  made by Rogoff (1985)  regarding  the
irrevocability  of central  bank independence.  As with that assumption,  it is not clear why
governments  that renege on exchange  rate pegs suffer larger  political  costs than governments
that renege  on more simple  policy  pledges  to maintain  a specific  rate of inflation  or to
maintain  a specific  rate of money  growth. 10 Little attempt has been  made to establish
whether  these costs, however  they are defined,  empirically  explain  differences  in the
outcomes  of pegging  across countries.
One question to ask, then, is whether checks  and balances  provide  an institutional
setting  in which the introduction  of a pegged  exchange  rate will  have  a more negative  effect
on expected  inflation. Three examples  make clear  that this is unlikely  to be the case.
First, it is common in the literature  to assume  that countries  peg their currencies  to
preferences  with  regard  to output-inflation  tradeoffs.
9 Inclusion  of this additional  parameter  also generates  the possibility  of multiple  equilibria,  an issue  we do not
discuss  here.
11the  currencies  of foreign  countries  with  inflation  much  lower  than  their  own. This  pegging
strategy  implies  that domestic  inflation  under  the exchange  rate  peg  could  be to the left of  the.
minimum  inflation  acceptable  to even  the most inflation-averse  domestic  policy  maker.  That
is,  if countries  are pegged  to currencies  that exhibit  sufficiently  low  inflation,  their  inflation
outcomes  if they  retain  the peg  are  less  than or equal  to the "inflation  with  CBI"  outcome  in
Figure  1. Following  the logic  in the  model  of Keefer  and  Stasavage  (2000),  such  inflation
outcomes  would  be overturned  by domestic  political  veto  players,  no matter  how  many  veto
players  there  are. Under  these  conditions  a peg  would  not change  expected  domestic
inflation,  regardless  of whether  there  are  checks  and  balances  in government.
A second  important  point  is  that  pegs  are  often  established  by the executive  branch
alone  without  legislative  approval.  If abandoning  a peg  is also  a matter  only  of executive
discretion,  we  reach  a similar  conclusion;  no matter  how  many  veto  players  are  present  in
government,  the peg  will  not  reduce  inflation  expectations,  because  the decision  to abandon
the peg  will  be the prerogative  of a single  veto  player.
Third,  even  if it is the case  that foreign  inflation  outcomes  are  not extremely  low  and
the introduction  of a peg  is a decision  of both the legislature  and  the executive  branch,  checks
and  balances  may  still  not improve  the efficacy  of the peg,  and  may  in fact  detract  from  it.
The question  is similar  to the earlier  discussion  of central  bank  independence.  There,  we
asked  whether,  under  checks  and  balances,  the introduction  of a central  bank  changes  the
default  inflation  outcome  that  prevails  in the absence  of government  action. We  can  ask  the
same  question  with  respect  to the  peg.
Take  a case  where  economic  circumstances  are  such  that government  intervention  is
necessary  to avoid  defacto  devaluation  and  abandonment  of the peg. Under  these
10  See  the observation  by Persson  and  Tabellini  (1994)  p.17.
12circumstances,  the default  outcome  under  a peg  - defacto  devaluation  -converges  to that
under  a flexible  exchange  rate  (where  the same  circumstances  would  also  lead  to devaluation).
A peg  is under  threat  whenever  economic  circumstances  trigger  an outflow  of foreign
reserves  and  those  reserves  are  scarce. Any  exogenous  shock  that increases  domestic
inflation  (such  as  a positive  supply/income  shock,  e, > Oin  equation  2,  which  increases
money  demand)  would,  in particular,  trigger  such  an outflow.
This  example  demonstrates  that if foreign  reserves  are scarce  and  a country  is
exposed  to inflationary  shocks,  a pegged  exchange  rate  leads  to nearly  the same  outcome  as  a
flexible  exchange  rate  in the absence  of countervailing  government  action.  If the default
outcome  is  the same  under  fixed  and  flexible  exchange  rates,  the presence  of checks  and
balances  makes  no difference  to the comparison.  Since  private  actors  have  no reason  to
expect  that  the options  available  to multiple  policy  makers  will  change  under  a pegged
exchange  rate  when  inflationary  shocks  occur,  they  have  no reason  to lower  their  inflation
expectations.  In inflationary  environments,  therefore,  even  in the presence  of checks  and
balances,  the pegged  exchange  rate  will  do little  to "tie  the hands"  of policy  makers.
Several  institutional  variations  have  been  omitted  from the foregoing  discussion.
Their  introduction  does  not fundamentally  change  the analysis,  however.  What  if  the
responsibility  for defending  an exchange  rate  peg  is assigned  to an independent  central  bank
or, even  more  stringently,  what  if a currency  board  arrangement  is  established  by  law? In  this
case  it is the independence  of the bank  or the legal  status  of the currency  board,  rather  than
the existence  of the peg,  that should  be the primary  focus  of analysis.
Similarly,  it is sometimes  the case  that  governments  attempt  to make  pegs  credible  by
giving  a central  bank  the right  to refuse  a request  by  the government  for monetary  financing
of a fiscal  deficit.  This  makes  it difficult  for government  to entertain  fiscal  policies  that would
13trigger  a loss of foreign  exchange  under a peg.  Again,  though, it is the presence  of central
bank independence  which secures  policy  credibility  and not the peg,  per  se.
Among the testable  hypotheses  that emerge  from this analysis  is one in particular  that
we examine  in section  4.
Proposition 2: Exchange rate pegs are no more effective as anti-inflationary dezices
wben there are multiple veto players in government.
3.  The signaling effect of monetary commitments
The literature  has identified  two further complications  to the time-inconsistency
problem analyzed  by Barro and Gordon. One is that private actors  often have incomplete
information  about the inflation-output  preferences  of political  decision  makers. A second
complication  is that the public  may  have difficulty  determining  the extent to which actual
inflation  is the deliberate  product  of the government's  planned rate of inflation,  or whether  it
is instead due to the realization  of shocks  to money  demand  that are beyond government
control (Canzoneri  1985). Incomplete  information  creates  incentives  for policymakers  to
take actions  that "signal"  their preferences  to the public. Imperfect  control of inflation
makes  these signals  difficult  for the public to interpret. Central  bank independence  and
pegged  exchange  rates have  both been identified  in the literature  as tools with which  low-
inflation  governments  can send more reliable  signals  about  their policy  preferences.
The role of signaling  in monetary  policy  was first introduced  in models  developed
Backus and Driffill (1985),  Barro (1986),  and Vickers  (1986).  These authors relax  the
assumption  from the Barro-Gordon  model of monetary  policy  that the public has complete
information  about  the inflation/output preferences  of policymakers  and instead assume  that
the public attempts  to update its beliefs  about policy  maker  type  based on the monetary
policies  that government  pursues. Vickers  shows  that inflation-averse  policy makers  may  be
14compelled  to adopt  an even  more  stringent  monetary  policy  than  they  prefer,  in order  to
distinguish  themselves  from  less  inflation-averse  policy  makers.  11 However,  imperfect
control  of inflation  complicates  this  signaling  as argued  above.  When  different  types  of
policy  makers  choose  different  rates  of inflation  in the first  period  of a signaling  game  this  is
referred  to as a separating  equilibrium,  while  when  both  policy  makers  choose  the same
inflation  rate  (due  to attempts  by less  conservative  policy  makers  to mimic  their  more
conservative  counterparts)  this  is referred  to as a pooling  equilibrium. 12
Several  authors,  such  as  Maxfield  (1997),  have  argued  that establishing  central  bank
independence  can  send  a signal  about  a government's  inflation  preferences.  Henrendorf
(1998)  and  Canavan  and Tommasi  (1997)  provide  formal  statements  of a simnilar  argument
regarding  exchange  rate  pegs:  they  are  easier  for private  actors  to verify  than  are  alternative
policy  targets  such  as  the money  supply.  In their  more  formal  argument  they  use  the
following  two  period  game.  In the first  period  governments  choose  whether  to adopt  an
exchange  rate  peg (or an independent  central  bank),  private  actors  fix  expected  inflation,  the
government  chooses  the rate  of inflation,  and  finally  private  actors  observe  final  inflation  (the
sum  of government's  unobserved  inflation  policy  and  a control  error).  In the second  period,
private  actors  update  their  beliefs  regarding  the government's  inflation  preferences,  they
revise  expected  inflation  accordingly,  and  the government  chooses  whether  to devalue  and  by
what  rate. The virtue  of the exchange  rate  peg  or independent  central  bank,  in these  models,
11 Barro (1986)  models monetary  policy  with  incomplete  information  using a different  set of assumptions.
Instead of assuming  that the public  is unsure  of the preferences  of decision  makers,  he models a game  where the
public is  uninformed about whether different  decision  makers  are able  to commit  to policy  announcements.  We
discuss  signaling  in monetary  policy  in the context of the Vickers  model, because  the assumptions  about
incomplete  information  in these  papers are more  dosely in line with the more general  game-theoretic  literature
on signaling.
12 Note, signaling  here allows  an inflation-averse  policy  maker  to distinguish  herself  from other types of
policnakers,  thus reducing  inflation  expectations,  but as long  as  the inflation-averse  policy  maker  still  places  a
non-zero  weight on using monetary  policy  to stabilize  output she still  has an incentive  to increase  inflation  once
the public  has fixed  its expectations  - that is, the original  time consistency  problem persists  independent  of the
15is precisely  that  the public  finds  it easier  to establish  the link  between  final  inflation  outcomes
and  government  policy  actions,  since  all  those  policy  decisions  that require  abandoning  the
peg  or revoking  the central  bank's  charter  are  easier  to distinguish  than  they  otherwise  would
have  been.
Signaling  and central  bank independence
Maxfield  (1997)  has argued  that many  recent  efforts  to increase  central  bank
independence  can  be explained  as attempts  by governments  to signal  policy  preferences.
When  the public  observes  high  inflation,  it cannot  distinguish  whether  this  is  the result  of a
money  demand  shock  or high  planned  inflation.  The government  announces  the creation  of
an independent  central  bank  and  claims  that it is  staffed  by inflation-averse  individuals.
If the public  subsequently  observes  high  inflation,  it understands  that  this can  only  be
consistent  with  the  planned  inflation  of a conservative  central  bank  if there  were  an
extraordinarily  high  money  demand  shock,  an event  that  occurs  with  low  probability.  The
public  is  therefore  likely  to believe  that  high  inflation  is  due  to meddling  by  the government,
either  in the form  of appointing  a liberal  central  banker  when  the government  claimed  the
banker  was  conservative,  or through  pressuring  the central  banker  to adopt  policies  closer  to
the government's  preferred  outcome.  This  would  make  the adoption  of an independent
central  bank  a potentially  valuable  signal  for an inflation-averse  govemment.
The difficulty  with  this  logic  is  that it does  not clearly  demonstrate  why  central  bank
independence  has a greater  signaling  value  than  do other  types  of policy  announcements.
The government  could  just as easily  have  announced  a paricular  inflation  or monetary
growth  target  at  the beginning  of the period,  and  the public  could  have  drawn  the same
conclusions  after  observing  final  inflation:  high  inflation  is more  likely  to be the result  of
resolution  of the imperfect  information  problem.
16reneging  on the target  than  of the low-probability  event  of a large  money  demand  shock.
One reply  to this  argument  might  be that,  as  Canavan  and  Tonunasi  observe,  it is
difficult  for the public  to track  money  growth.  If it is  easier  to assess  the preferences  of  the
central  bank  or the extent  of government  interference  in central  bank  decisions  than  to verify
government  claims  about  money  growth,  the announcement  of central  bank  independence
could  indeed  provide  a better  signal  thari  a simple  policy  announcement.  However,  it seems
implausible  that governnent  meddling  in central  bank  decisions  should  always  be easy  to
observe.  Governments  do not need  to revoke  the charter  of a central  bank  or replace  a
central  bank  governor  to pressure  central  banks  to pursue  a more  generous  monetary  policy.
They  can  instead  exercise  more  subtle  and less  visible  forms  of pressure,  ranging  from
reducing  the resources  of the central  bank  to social  ostracism  of the central  bank  leadership.
Nor is it the case  that central  bankers  are  usually  willing  to resign  when  pressured  to
undertake  policies  with  which  they  disagree  (despite  occasional  heroic  examples  of the
contrary).
This  discussion  suggests  that central  bank  independence  is  likely  to be a weak
response  to the problem  of incomplete  information  in monetary  policy.  As in the earlier
discussion,  though,  we can  ask  what  effect  the institutional  environment  has on the efficacy
of central  bank  independence  in treating  this problem. 13 We  know  from  the earlier  argument
that government  meddlng  is  more  difficult  in the presence  of checks  and balances.
However,  the key  issue  in a signaling  context  is  whether,  under  checks  and  balances,
meddling  with  central  bank  decisions  is more  zisib than  govenmment  management  of
monetary  growth.  There  are  a number  of reasons  to suspect  that  this might  be the case.  For
example,  override  of a central  bank  may  require  a legislative  act  that  is more  public  than  the
17bureaucratic  issuance  of monetary  growth  figures,  and  less  demanding  of special  expertise  to
interpret.  Competing  political  actors  inside  government  may  have  a greater  incentive  to
register  public  complaints  about  the  treatment  of  the central  bank  than  about  the  massaging
of  money  growth  data.  We  leave  to further  work  the  more  rigorous  exploration  of this  issue,
however.
Signaling  and excbange rate  pegs
Deviation  from  exchange  rate  pegs  is  transparent  and  for  that  reason  pegging  is
potentially  more  effective  than  central  bank  independence  as  a signal  of  policy  maker  inflation
preferences  (Broz,  1999).  In particular,  abandonment  of  a peg  is  a more  transparent  indicator
of inflationary  government  practices  than  is  either  a high  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply
(which  may  be generated  by  an  unanticipated  change  in  the  money  multiplier)  or a high  rate
of  inflation  (which  may  result  from  a shock  to money  demand).  This  avoids  the  uncertainties
surrounding  the  connection  between  unobserved  government  policy  and  observed  final
inflation,  allowing  the  public  to better  infer  the  preferences  of  government  actors  after
observing  first  period  inflation  and  before  signing  contracts  governing  each  subsequent
period.  14
Canavan  and  Tommasi  (1997)  and  Herrendorf  (1999)  have  formalized  this  argument
using  somewhat  different  models. 15 Both  models  provide  a rigorous  explanation  of  previous
empirical  findings  showing  that  countries  that  have  adopted  fixed  exchange  rate  pegs  have
lower  inflation  than  others.  However,  the specific  predictions  of  these  models  have  not  yet
13 Clark  and Maxfield  (1997)  also emphasize  the importance  of examining  the institutional  context.
14 An alternative  proposed  solution  to  the  private  information  problem  is  for  a central  bank  to commit  to
publishing  its  inflation  forecast,  as  discussed  by  Faust  and  Svensson  (2000).
15  The  conclusions  of  Herrendorff's  model  are  very  similar  to those  of Canavan  and  Tommasi,  except  he
follows  Barro  (1986)  in assuming  that  there  is  incomplete  information  about  the  ability  of  policymakers  to
commit  rather  than  about  the  preferences  of policy  makers.
18been  empiricalUy  tested. In particular,  the basic  premise  is that  pegging  should  be more
effective  in environments  in which  it is difficult  for  the public  to distinguish  the government
contribution  to inflation.  Canavan  and  Tomassi  show  that  inflation  should  be lower  the
greater  is  the precision  with  which  the public  can  observe  the contribution  of  the
governnent's  policy  action  to final  inflation.  Since  in their  model  the point  of pegging  the
exchange  rate  is to increase  this precision,  if precision  is high  to begin  with  (in  the absence  of
a peg),  we would  expect  the peg  to have  little  impact  on inflation. 16
As  with  central  banks,  we can  ask  whether  the signaling  effect  of pegs  changes  in the
presence  of checks  and  balances.  It is evident  that  abandoning  a peg  that  was  previously
established  is as  visible  to the public  when  there  are  multiple  veto  players  as when  there  is
only one. The signaling  value  of the peg does not, therefore, change. The question  of
whether  pegs are more or less  likely  to be adopted  under checks  and balances  is the more
important  and complex  one, exceeding  the bounds of this paper. 17 For examnple,  executives
might be more likely  to adopt a peg in the presence  of an effective  legislature  in order to
signal  their private  information  about their ability  to gain  legislative  cooperation  in the
conduct of macroeconomic  policy. On the other hand, if all veto players  are required  to
acquiesce  to a peg (as in the case  of a currency  board)  and they had distinct  preferences  over
inflation,  a peg may  be less likely  to emerge  under checks  and balances.
16 In their  model,  the inflation  choices  of the two  types  of decision  makers  are given  by equation  2.11
A  1+  1- 4/  P  , where  the parameter  A' indicates  the inflation  tolerance  of the two  types,  I and  2;
2  P  + PA J1
,  is the discount  rate;  the precision  with  which  the  public  can  distinguish  the two  types  is captured  byp,, and
the  precision  with  which  the public  can  infer  the policy  choices  of the decision  makers  from  the observed
inflation  outcome  ispC,.  Differentiating  the expression  with  respect  to  p,  one  can  see  that  inflation  rises  with
the dispersion  of the control  error  (the  noise  in the system).  Other  predictions  also  emerge  from  the model.
For example,  by differentiating  again  with  respect  to  pA  or the discount  rate  A,  we  can also  see  that  the impact
on inflation  of a reduction  in  the standard  deviation  of the control  error  is greatest  when  pA and  /8  are  smaller  -
that is,  when  it is more  difficult  for  the public  to distinguish  the high  and  low  inflation  types,  and  when  officials
have  longer  horizons.
19The above  discussion  of  central  banks  and  pegged  exchange  rates  suggests  that if
these  are  indeed  to be useful  as signals,  then  they  should  have  the greatest  impact  on inflation
when  the public  has  the greatest  difficulty  discerning  government  policy  contributions  to
inflation  outcomes,  due  for exarnple  to volatility  of money  demand.  Propositions  3 and  4
reflect  this  logic,  negatively  in the case  of central  banks,  which  we argue  are  unlikely  to
provide  a useful  signal,  and  positively  in the case  of fixed  exchange  rates.  We test  these
propositions  in Section  4.
Proposition  3: The effectiveness  of central  bank independence  in reducing inflation
does not vary with the public's difficulty in inferring  government  policy cboices  from
inflation  outcomes.
Proposition  4. Exchange rate  pegs will be more effective  in reducing  inflation  when
the public has greater  difficulty  inferring  government  policy cboices  from inflation
outcomes.
4.  Empirical tests
In order  to test our propositions,  we exanine  economic  and  political  determinants  of
inflation  in a sample  of 78 countries  covering  the period  1975-1994.  This choice  of time
period  is  determined  by  the end  of the Bretton  Woods  era  and  by data  availability.  Our
empirical  tests  follow  the specifications  used  in recent  papers  investigating  the effect  of
monetary  institutions  on inflation  outcomes  including  Franzese  (1999),  Hall  and  Franzese
(1998),  Campillo  and  Miron  (1996)  and  Cukierman,  Webb,  and  Neyapti  (1992).  Because  the
institutional  variables  with  which  we are  concerned  change  with  relatively  low  frequency,  we
follow  the majority  of recent  papers  in the literature  by  investigating  period  averages.  We
report  results  both from cross-section  regressions  (averaging  values  for each  country  over  the
entire  period)  and from  cross-section  time-series  regressions  where  variables  are averaged
17 See Bernhard and Leblang  (1999)
20across  five-year  time  periods.
Presentation  of data
We  use  inflation  as our dependent  variable,  following  the logic  that  where  the
inflation  bias  due  to time-consistency  problems  is higher,  so also  is  inflation.  In order  to
control  for the effect  of countries  with  extremely  high  levels  of inflation,  we  use  the log  of
the inflation  rate. 18
To measure  central  bank  independence  we  use the index  developed  by  Cukierman,
Webb,  and  Neyapti  (1992),  since  this  is the one  indicator  which  covers  a sample  of both
OECD  and  non-OECD  countries.  It is  based  on sixteen  different  characteristics  of central
bank  statutes,  such  as  provisions  for monetary  policy  decisions,  resolution  of conflicts
between  central  bank  and government,  and  provisions  for replacing  the central  bank
governor.  While  Cukierman,  Webb,  and  Neyapti's  original  dataset  runs  only  up to 1989,
more  recent  studies  have  compiled  updated  information  on central  bank  independence  and  in
some  cases  data  on new  countries  (see  in particular  Cukierman,  Miller  and  Neyapti  (1998).19
The IMF's  Annual  Report  on Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions
presents  information  on exchange  rate  pegs,  as  reported  by  Ghosh  et al.  (1995).20  We  have
classified  countries  according  to those  which  adopt  some  form  of a nominal  exchange  rate
peg  (peg  = 1)  and  those  which  do not. This  covers  countries  which  peg  their  currency  to a
single  other  currency  and  those  which  peg  to a basket  of currencies.  Countries  that allow  a
very  limited  amount  of nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility  (as  in the European  Monetary
System)  are  also  classified  as having  pegged  regimes.  We opt for this  binary  classification
18 Based on CPI data from the IMF, Inhmdcn  Fiwxid Stausucs
19  Note  that  the defaco  indicator  that  they  have  developed  of central  bank  independence,  rates  of central  bank
govemor  turnover, are not appropriate  for our tests, since  we are precisely  interested  in the extent to which legal
prescriptions  prevent  this sort of intervention.
21(peg  vs.  no peg),  because  economic  theoiy  does  not offer  firm  predictions  about  the extent  to
which  some  types  of pegs  might  be more  effective  than others.
This  study  also  uses  newly  developed  cross-country  data  on political  institutions.
Keefer  (1998)  has developed  a measure  of checks  and  balances  in government,  based  on
objective  indicators  assembled  by  Beck  et al.  (1999).  The  index  counts  the number  of veto
players  present  in a political  system,  including  both  what  Tsebelis  (1995)  has  called
"constitutional"  veto  players  as  well  as "partisan"  veto  players.  For presidential  systems
checks  counts  the number  of veto  players,  counting  the executive  and  legislative  chamber(s)
separately  only  if they  are  controlled  by different  parties.  For parliamentary  systems,  checks
counts  the number  of parties  in the government  coalition,  based  on the assumption  that
individual  coalition  members  will  enjoy  veto  power  over  policy.  The index  is modified  to
take  into account  the fact  that certain  electoral  rules  (closed  list vs. open  list)  affect  the
cohesiveness  of governing  coalitions. 21 Since  the probabilitythat  at least one actor prefers
the status quo is likely  to increase  at a decreasing  rate with the number of veto players
counted by checks,  we use a log version of check, kg  dkk, in our regressions.
Testing  of the informational  propositions  3 and 4 requires  variables  that capture  the
public's difficulty  in distinguishing  between inflation  generated  by government  policy  and
inflation  generated  by exogenous  shocks. We use several  different  proxy measures  for the
public's  uncertainty,  achieving  significant  results with all of them.
The first measure  we use to proxy for the degree  of uncertainty  about inflation  policy
20 We have updated  this dataset  to cover the period 1990-94.
21 For presidential  systerns,  "ks is  the sun of 1 for the president  and 1 for each legislative  chamber. The
value  is increased  by 1 if an electoral  competition  index developed  by Bates,  Ferree, and Singh  is greater  than 4
(out of a possible  7). Also, in closed  list systems  where the president's  party  is the 1st government  party,  the
legislature  is not counted. For parliamentary  systems,  o"ks is the sum of I for the prime minister  and 1 for each
party in the governing  coalition. If elections  are based on a closed  list system  and the prime minister's  party  is
the 1st  government  party,  then this sum is reduced by one. As for presidential  systems,  the value  of cheks  is
22is instability  in a country's  money  multiplier,  suggested  by both Canavan  and Tommasi and by
Herrendorf as a source of error in the public's inference  of government  policy  from inflation
outcomes. We use the variable  wvdk  M2/MO,  the standard  deviation  of the ratio of broad
money (b2) to base money  (MO),  as our second measure  of uncertainty  about inflation
policy. The idea is that the government  or central  bank controls  base money directly,  but
inflation  outcomes also depend  upon unobserved  influences  on broad money. Where  the
money  multiplier  is volatile,  the public  faces a larger  challenge  in inferring  monetary policy
from inflation  outcomes. 22
The second measure  of the noise that interferes  with the public's  ability  to infer
government  policy  is the volatility  of the terms of trade. The variable  vdatky tot  measures  the
standard  deviation  of the annual  change  in a country's  capacity  to irnport as a share of
national  income. 23 The capacity  of a country  to purchase  imports  out of its exports can
increase  either because  the world prices  of a country's  imported goods  have fallen  relative  to
those of its exports, or because  a country  has experienced  a positive  supply  or income shock
so that it can afford more imports  (for example,  if its costs of production  have exogenously
declined). Under a flexible  exchange  rate, both shocks have  implications  for domestic  prices.
Consequently,  the larger  the wlai1ity  tot measure,  the larger  are  the shocks  that are obscuring
government  inflation  policy,  and the larger  the impact  that we would expect the introduction
of a peg to have on inflation. 24
modified  upwards by 1 if the value  of the index for electoral  competition  is greater  than 4.
22 In our section considering  the robustness  of our results  we also ask whether including  volatility  in the money
multiplier  as an explanatory  variable  creates  a simultaneity  bias in our regressions.
23 WorULE  doutdinatr  CD-ROM.  The  terms of trade adjustment  variable  that we use equals  capacity  to
irmport  less exports of goods and services.  Data are in constant local currency.  We  preferred  this to a another
standard  terms of trade measure,  (price  of exports / price of imports),  because  the extent to which terms of
trade shocks affect domestic  inflation  depends  not only on the size  of the shocks,  but also on the degree  of
openness  of an economy.
24 It is interesting  to note here that governments  with volatile  terms of trade will  face  an acute dilemma,  because
23The  third  proxy  we  use to gauge  the public's  difficulty  in observing  planned  inflation
is the quality  of a country's  economic  data. As  Herrendorf  (1998)  argues,  when  a country's
consumer  price  statistics  are  known  to indude  frequent  errors,  it is  more  difficult  for the
public  to assess  the true rate  of inflation  and  therefore  more  difficult  to extract  from actual
inflation  the underlying  and  unobserved  inflation  policies  followed  by  the government.  The
introduction  of a peg  has a larger  irnpact  on the precision  with  which  the  public  can  assess
government  policy  when CPI  data  is of poor  quality,  and  therefore  should  have  a larger
downward  impact  on inflation.  The quality  of a country's  consumer  price index  data  cannot
be measured  directly,  but there  are  indicators  available  which  are  designed  to measure  the
overall  quality  of a country's  economic  statistics.  The Penn  World  Tables  data  set
constructed  by Summers  and  Heston  (19xx)  includes  a measure  of data  quality,  grade,  which
is  based  on results  of United  Nations  surveys.  A higher  value  for grade  indicates  more
reliable  data.
In addition  to the institutional  and  informational  variables,  the regressions  include
three  further  variables  to control  for determinants  of inflation  that are  unrelated  to the
theoretical  arguments  in the paper. First,  there are  both strong  theoretical  and  empirical
reasons  to believe  that political  instability  is causally  linked  with  inflation.  In order  to
measure  political  instability  with  irnproved  precision,  we  have  developed  a new  variable
politia  ins&1,  based  on information  in the database  reported  in Beck,  et al.,  which  for each
country  and  each  period  measures  the fraction  of all  veto  players  who  were  replaced  from  the
period  earlier.  In authoritarian  systems  with  only  one  veto  player  this amounts  to measuring
if exchange  rate  pegs  have  a greater  anti-inflationary  imnpact  in countries  with  more  volatile  terms  of  trade,
govermnents  which  peg  will  also  find  it  more  difficult  to achieve  real  exchange  rate  adjustments,  and  this  cost
witl  be greater  the  more  volatile  are  temis  of  trade.  Thus,  traditional  theories  of  exchange  rate  regime  choice
and  predictions  derived  from  Canavan  and  Tomnmasi  and  Herendorf  suggest  opposite  policy  prescriptions  for
governments  with  volatile  terms  of  trade.
24the rate of government  turnover. In systems  with more than one veto player,  however,  this
variable  captures  the possibility  that governments  might frequently  change,  but some
coalition  partners  might be present  in several  successive  governments.
Following  Romer  (1993)  we also include  a measure  of openness based on the
argument  that incentives  for policy  makers  to generate  surprise  inflation  should  be weaker  in
countries  which are  more open to trade. The variable  openss is measured  in the standard
manner as the sum of exports  plus imports, divided  by a country's  GDP.
We also include  the log of real GDP per capita  as a control variable. One rationale
for induding lg GDP is that poorer countries  tend to have  less  well developed  tax systems,
and under these conditions  governments  have an increased  incentive  to rely on seignorage  for
revenue. A further rationale  is that some of our institutional  variables  are highly  correlated
with levels  of income. Including  log  GDP  in the specification  addresses  concerns  that our
political  and informational  variables  are merely  proxying  for overall  levels  of development
between  countries.
25Table I: Summary statistics
Variable  No.  mean  std. dev.  min.  max.
obs.
logi  4ition  277  -2.02  1.43  -5.39  3.90
CBI  297  0.35  0.13  0.10  0.82
log  ck  293  0.95  0.48  0  2.08
peg  297  0.53  0.41  0  1
grade  266  2.43  1.04  1  4
wLatilM2/MO  226  1.07  2.45  .02  27
aLity tot  258  0.02  0.03  0  0.16
pxit!ia  nai  289  0.15  0.14  0  0.68
O?ess  279  68.4  52.4  10  394
log  GDP  275  8.06  1.62  4.57  10.7
Testing  propositions  1  & 2
We  evaluate  our first  and  second  propositions  by  using  a model  with  interaction
terms,  which  allows  the marginal  effect  of central  bank  independence  and  exchange  rate  pegs
on inflation  to vary  with  the extent  of checks  and  balances.  The general  form of our
regressions  is as follows.
logvatin = a + ,B,CBI  +  A  M. + 3 CBI  x kgcdek + A  xkgd-k  + A ops  + BA
iaby  +  A, b1dp  +  A logda:k
Proposition  1  predicts  that  the interaction  term CBI  x log  dxck  has  a negative
coefficient  while  the interaction  term  Peg  x lg dxck  is  predicted  in Proposition  2 to be
insignificant.  The net effect  of central  bank  independence,  given  by A1  + A3 *logdxck  should
26be negative  at  high  levels  of checks  and  balances.  In contrast,  proposition  2 does  not deliver
a firm  prediction  about  whether  the net effect  of pegging  02 +  6 4 *I1gdbk  should  be positive
or negative  at high  levels  of checks  and balances.
Regressions  1  and 2 in Table  II report  results  of baseline  regressions  that  do not
include  interaction  terms. In both regressions  the estimated  anti-inflationary  effect  of
adopting  an exchange  rate  peg  is both statistically  and  economically  significant.  In contrast,
in both samples  the coefficient  on CBI  is  actually  positive  and  significant,  suggesting  that
higher  central  bank  independence  is actually  associated  with  higher  rates  of  inflation  when
one  controls  for other  determinants.  This  is a strong  indication  that legal  central  bank
independence  on its own  is,  on average,  unlikely  to deliver  anti-inflationary  credibility.
Regressions  3 and 4  test our propositions  about  the effect  of political  institutions  on
the credibility  of monetary  commitments.  In both  regressions  the coefficient  on the
interaction  terrn  CBI  x dcks is negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the 5  percent  leveL  The
substantive  results  of the regressions  are  also  consistent  with  Proposition  1. Based  on the
estimates  in regression  3 in a parlianentary  system  with  a three party  coalition  (logdkh  = 1.6)
an increase  of 0.2  in CBI  (equivalent  to moving  from  the 25th percentile  to the  75th percentile
in the sample)  would  be associated  with a 37  percent  decrease  in the annual  rate  of inflation.
The  effect  of the same  increase  in central  bank  independence  in a parliamentary  system  with  a
single  party  majority  (logd,eak=1.1)  would  actually  be an itnrse in inflation  of 39 percent.
To provide  a better  visual  impression  of our findings,  Figure  I shows  the estimated
effect  on log  inflation  of a 0.2 increase  in CBI  at different  levels  of logdxck  (based  on
regression  3). The solid  line  represents  the estimated  effect,  the two dotted  lines  represent
the boundaries  of the 90%  confidence  interval,  and  the horizontal  line  represents  0 change  in
27inflation. 25 The evidence  here  suggests  that increased  central  bank  independence  has a
negative  effect  on inflation  only  in the set  of countries  with  relatively  high  levels  of checks
and  balances  (within  the highest  quartile  of our sample).
Table II: CBI, exchange  rate pegs, and political  institutions
depvar. log inflation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  1.15  0.33  -0.33  -0.56
(0.91)  (0.62)  (1.61)  (0.66)
oJ'ess  0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.003
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.00)  (0.002)
log  GDP  -0.36  -0.27  -0.37  -0.26
(0.11)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.11)
potiI.  intbl  1.52  1.34  0.43  1.21
(1.52)  (0-40)  (1.46)  (0.41)
CBI  2.14  1.84  10.3  5.15
(1.03)  (0.48)  (4.15)  (1.75)
Pg  -2.07  -0.84  -4.50  -1.33
(0.61)  (0.20)  (1.11)  (0.56)
kg chrk  -0.04  -0.36  1.73  0.54
(0.54)  (0.19)  (1.62)  (0.51)
CBlx log  check  -7.58  -3.20
(3.91)  (1.50)
peg x log cbeck  2.05  0.44
(0.95)  (0.38)
R2  0.40  0.29  0.46  0.30
N  78  258  78  258
p-value  for Chi-sq.  p<Q.01  p<0.01  P<0.01  p<0.01
OLS  with  White's  heteroskedastic  consistent  standard  errors  for  regressions  1 and  3 reported  in
parentheses.  Regressions  2 and  4 are estimated  using  panel  corrected  standard  errors.
25 Since  the effect  of a change  in CBI  here  depends  on both  B 1and  B3, we  calculated  the standard  error  of the
effect  using  a formula  which  takes  into  account  both  the variance  of each  individual  coefficient  and  their
covariance.
28Figure 1:  estimated  effect of 0.2 increase in CBI
(at different levels of log check)
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Regressions  3 and 4 in Table II suggest  that exchange  rate pegs may  actually  be less
effective  as anti-inflationary  commitments  when there are multiple  veto players  in
government. This result  is consistent  with proposition  2. The interaction  tern pegx dcexks  is
positive  in both regressions,  significantly  in the cross-sectional  estimation  but not otherwise.
In both regressions  the estimated  effect on inflation  of adopting  an exchange  rate peg is
negative for nearly  all sample  values  of checks  and balances  (the maximum  value  of logdvck
is 2.07). However,  the magnitude  of this effect is much smaller  in countries  characterized  by
checks  and balances  in government.
Taken together,  the above  results  provide support for the idea that the structure  ofpolitical  institutions  plays  an  important  role  with  regard  to monetary  commitments  and  that
this effect  varies  dramaticaly  depending  upon  the type  of monetaly  commitment  under
consideration.  While  central  bank  independence  is likely  to have  a bigger  increase  on
credibility  in political  systems  with  multiple  veto  players,  the opposite  may  well  occur  with
exchange  rate  pegs.
Testing propositions  3 & 4
If central  banks  or exchange  rate  pegs  help  governments  credibly  commit  because
they  are  transparent,  then their  anti-inflationary  effects  should  be greatest  in countries  where
it is  particularly  difficult  for the  public  to distinguish  between  inflation  attributable  to
deliberate  government  decisions  and  inflation  attributable  to exogenous  shocks.  We  have
argued  that  exchange  rate  pegs  should  exhibit  this characteristic,  but  that  central  bank
independence  is unlikely  to be an informative  signal.  As  with  propositions  I and  2, these
propositions  can best  be tested  in a model  with interaction  terms,  which  follows  the
specification  below.  We  use  three  different  proxies  for the ability  of the public  to distinguish
the contribution  of governmnent  policy  to final  inflation  outcomes:  the Summers  and  Heston
grade  for data  quality  (grade),  instability  of  the money  multiplier  (vdatilty  M2/MO),  and  a
variable  capturing  instability  in terms  of trade (vdatiity  tot). Based  on proposition  3,  we
predict  that  the interaction  term  peg  x  grade  should  have  a positive  sign  (since  data  quality  is
higher  in countries  where  the value  of  grade  is high),  while  the  interaction  terms  pegx Wiity
tot  and  p  x voatility  M2/MO  should  be negative.  We again  report  results  from both cross-
section  regressions  and  from  regressions  based  on 5-year  period  averages.logazi*m  - a+ 6,CBI  + 62  pe  g + P3  CI  X  +  ii  + 6 pix
4#ntia  uize  + A 6 Pm  + Ai=W4  a  Ask  kc*  + A lcgcxzk
The results  in Table  III suggest  that exchange  rate  pegs  are  more  effective  as  anti-inflationary
commitments  under  conditions  where  data  quality  is  poor and  there  is significant  economic
volatility  which  makes  it more  difficult  for the public  to observe  government  policy  choices.
In regressions  1  and  2 the interaction  term pe x grade  is  positive  and  highly
significant,  as predicted.  The economic  significance  of the peg  effect  is  also  quite  large.
Based  on regression  2, for a country  with  a Summers  and  Heston  grade  for data  quality
equivalent  to the 25' percentile  of the sample  (1.7),  adopting  an exchange  rate  peg  is
estimated  to result  in a 62 percent  reduction  in the annual  rate  of inflation.  A country  with  a
grade  for data  quality  equivalent  to the 75th  percentile  would,  in contrast,  be predicted  to
experience  only  a 45 percent  increase  in annual  inflation. 26
26 Elastiaties  calculated  using  the forrnula  for dummy  variables  in a semi-log  equation  proposed  by  Halvorsen
and  Palmquist  (1980).Table III: CBI, exchange  rate pegs, and information
depvar:  log inflation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -3.09  -2.17  -3.03  -1.68  -1.50  -1.52
(1.16)  (0.47)  (1.36)  (0.70)  (1.75)  (1.01)
qr*ss  -0.01  -0.01  -0.002  -0.004  0.002  -0.001
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)
lgGDP  0.26  0.18  -0.22  -0.19  -0.37  -0.29
(0.14)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.12)
ptlitabily  -0.43  0.82  0.87  1.16  0.43  1.14
(1.07)  (0.44)  (1.44)  (0.33)  (1.72)  (0.44)
CBI  10.2  6.56  10.2  5.12  10.2  6.15
(2.96)  (1.45)  (4.26)  (2.13)  (4.80)  (1.46)
peg  -3.37  -2.14  -1.43  -0.47  -2.04  -0.24
(0.93)  (0.52)  (0.63)  (0.28)  (1.16)  (0.24)
kag  oh-k  2.96  0.76  2.82  0.94  2.59  0.80
(1.15)  (0.61)  (1.39)  (0.60)  (1.82)  (0.43)
CBI  x l  dck  -7.37  -2.40  -8.20  -3.58  -7.73  -3.65
(3.20)  (1.63)  (4.01)  (1.65)  (4.64)  (1.43)
grade  -1.20  -0.73
(0.49)  (0.21)
peg  x grade  0.90  0.68
(0.27)  (0.12)
CBI  x grade  -0.79  -1.26
(1.00)  (0.48)
rdtzlay tot  27.1  22.2
(22.0)  (22.9)
peg  x wity  tot  -39.2  -24.0
(15.9)  (10.9)
CBI*wLatiity  tot  14.1  -0.33
(78.5)  (45.3)
zdatu  i  M2/MO  0.15  0.72
(0.29)  (0.23)
pLg  x wlatiey  M2/MO  -0.05  -0.55
(0.30)  (0.18)
CBI  x vda&iy M2/MO  -0.15  -0.42
(0.48)  (0.47)
R2  0.65  0.45  0.56  0.34  0.32  0.34
N  67  247  74  246  62  202
p-value  for Chi-sq.  p<O.O1  p<O.01  p<0.01  p<O.01  p<O.01  p<O.01
OLS with White's  heteroskedastic  consistent  standard  errors for regressions  1 and 3 reported in parentheses.
Regressions  2,4, and 6 are estimated  using panel  corrected  standard  enrors.In regressions  3-6 coefficients  on the interaction  terms for peg x volatility  tot and peg
x volatility  M2/MO  are negative  as predicted and generally  highly  significant.  Once again,
these results are also substantively  significant.  For example,  based on the estimates  in
regression  6 the effect of adopting  an exchange  rate peg would  be a 32 percent drop in
inflation  for a country with relatively  low volatility  in its money  multiplier  (0.27,  the value  for
the 25'h  percentile),  while  the effect for a country  with high  volatility  (1.01,  the value  for the
75th percentile)  would be a 55 percent drop in annual  average  inflation. We provide a visual
display  of the estimated  of effect  of adopting an exchange  rate peg in Figure II, below,  which
shows that effect of a peg, (together  with the estimated  90%  confidence  interval)  at different
levels  of money multiplier  volatility  (based  on regression  6 in Table III). The horizontal  line
represents  0 change  in log inflation.
Fig  II:  estimated  effect  of an exchange  rate  peg









stdev  money  multiplierIn stark  contrast  with  our results  with  regard  to exchange  rate  pegs,  the effect  of
central  bank  independence  does  not seem  to vary  significantly  with  the extent  of either  terms
of trade  volatility  or volatility  in a country's  money  multiplier.  The coefficients  CBIx wlatility
M2/MO  and  CBI  x volity  tot  are  not statistically  significant  in regression  3-6. The results
with  regard  to data  quality  are  more  mixed.  While  as our  theory  predicts,  the interaction  term
CBI  x grade  is not significant  in regression  1,  it is significant  in regression  2.
5. Robustness  of the results
We  consider  here  several  issues  that might  affect  the robustness  of our results,
including  whether  our institutional  variables  are  proxying  for more  general  features  of
political  systems,  whether  the results  are  biased  by  autocorrelation,  and  whether  they  may  be
biased  by  endogeneity  of central  bank  independence  to inflation.
While  the estimation  results  are  consistent  with all  three  of our propositions,  there
may  be potential  concerns  whether  several  of our explanatory  variables  are  measuring  the
phenomena  we claim,  or whether  they  might  in fact  be capturing  more  general  features  of
political  systems,  such  as  levels  of democracy  or levels  of income.  The simple  correlation
between  the variable  denxcracy  from  the Polity  III dataset  and  our variable  clxcks  is fairly  high
(0.52),  and  the simple  correlation  between  our measure  of data  quality  (gnade)  and  derrcracy  is
even  higher  (0.74).  Similar  conclusions  might  be drawn  from  the high  correlation  of  grade
and  cbetks  with  per capita  income. 27
Given  that  models  where  the effect  of central  bank  independence  or of exchange  rate
pegs  vary  with  levels  of democracy  or income  would  be alternative  specifications,  the best
27 The simple  correlations  of our two other information  variables  vk6iy  tot  and vda9i M2/MO  with either  log
GDP  or danxracy  did  not exceed  0.35,  and  so  we  do not consider  the possibility  that  these  specifications  areway  to test these  alternative  hypotheses  against  the specifications  in Tables  II and  III is  to use
the  J-test  methodology  developed  by  Davidson  and  Mackinnon  (1981).  This  test involves
estimating  the two  specifications  to be compared  and  then  re-estimating  each  specification
while  including  the fitted  values  from the alternative  model  as an explanatory  variable  in each
regression. 28 The t-statistic  on the fitted  values  can  be interpreted  as  a test of the null  that  the
alternative  specification  uzwuWnot  add  explanatory  power  to the existing  model.  Table  IV
below  reports  results  of -tests  where  we  tested  regression  4 from  Table  II and  regression  2
from Table  III against  two  alternative  specifications.  The first  alternative  involved  replacing
the relevant  institutional  or informational  variable  with  the Polity  III measure  demxaLy.  The
second  alternative  specification  involved  replacing  the relevant  institutional  or informational
variable  with  log  GDP.
What  should  we conclude  from  the above  results?  The test statistics  are  significant  in
most  cases  at  the 1 percent  level  and  in all  but one  case  at  the 10  percent  level  of  confidence.
In three  out of four  cases,  specifications  using  only  dencracy  or lg GDP  add  explanatory
power  to our existing  specifications  from Tables  II and III. The exception  here  is regression
2 from  Table  III where  we clearly  reject  the donocray  specification  in favor  of the grat
specification.  Likewise,  using  the 10  percent  level  as  a cutoff,  all  of the specifications  using
our institutional  and  informational  variables  add  explanatory  power  to regressions  using  only
danoraty  and  1g  GDP. In sum,  we can reject  the hypothesis  that our institutional  and
informational  variables  are  simply  proxying  for more  general  phenomena.  At the same  time,
however,  more  general  features  of democracy  or levels  of income  may  also  have  an influence
on the effectiveness  of central  bank  independence  or exchange  rate  pegs  as commitment
picking  up effects  due  to levels  of GDP or democracy.
28For an application  of J-test  methodology  to compare  alternative  political  economy  hypotheses  see  Franzese
(1999).mechanisms.
Table IV:  J-tests against alternative specifications
regression  null  hypothesis  alternative  p-value
hypothesis
Table  11  4  log  check  democracy  p0.00
democracy  log  check  p-0.08
Table  III 2  grade  democracy  p-Q54
democracy  grade  p-0.00
Table  II 4  log  check  log  GDP  p-0.00
log  GDP  log  check  p-0.09
Table  III 2  grade  log  GDP  p-0.00
log  GDP  grade  p-0.00
We also  considered  whether  the results  of our statistical  tests  might  be biased  by serial
correlation  of error  terms.  With  regard  to autocorrelation,  our  cross-section  results  are  by
definition  immune  from  this  problem,  and  therefore  should  assuage  concern  about  the
importance  of autocorrelation  for  our  findings.  Nevertheless,  standard  Lagrange  multiplier
tests  did  detect  autocorrelation  in  our  five-year  period  regressions.  Using  a Prais-Winsten
regression,  rather  than  OLS  estimates,  would  be  one  way  to deal  with  this  problem.
However,  using  this  technique  depends  upon  accepting  the  restriction  that  the  autoregressive
process  influencing  each  of  the  variables  in our  regression  is  identical.  Standard  testing
procedures  strongly  reject  this  restriction.  As  a result,  we  have  chosen  to retain  our  OLS
estimates.
As  a final  robustness  test,  we  also  considered  the  possibility  that  there  rnight  be biases
in  our  results  due  to the endogeneity  of  certain  explanatory  variables..  This  could  involve  the
endogeneity  of  legal  central  bank  independence  to past  levels  of  inflation.  It could  also
involve  the  possibilities  for  simultaneity  bias,  if  variables  shocks  have  an effect  on both  CBIand  log  in  within  the same  time  period.  Volatility  in the money  multiplier  (vokiLty
M2/MO)  might  also  be subject  to this  problem.  In the case  of central  bank  independence,
Granger  causality  tests failed  to establish  that current  levels  of CBI  were  'Granger-caused"  by
lagged  levels  of log  inflation.  With  regard  to simultaneity  bias,  a Hausman  specification  test
did  not reject  OLS  estimates  from  Table  II when  compared  with  estimates  which
instrumented  for current  values  of central  bank  independence  with  past  values.  In the case  of
volatility  in the multiplier  vwadity  M2/MO,  a Hausman  specification  test also  failed  to reject
the consistency  of the OLS  estimates.
Conclusion
In this  paper  we have  attempted  develop  and  test several  new  hypotheses  about  the
anti-inflationary  effect  of central  bank  independence  and exchange  rate  pegs  across  different
institutional  and  informational  contexts.  Theory  provides  a strong  reason  for believing  that
while  central  bank  independence  will  prove  more  effective  as a commitment  mechanism  in
countries  with  multiple  veto  players  in government,  the credibility  of exchange  rate  pegs  will
not be increased  by  these  multiple  veto  players.  We  reach  an opposite  conclusion  with  regard
to the effect  of central  bank  independence  and  exchange  rate  pegs  in different  informational
contexts.  In economically  volatile  conditions,  where  it is more  difficult  for  the public  to
distinguish  inflation  deliberately  generated  by government  from  inflation  created  by
unanticipated  economic  shocks,  the anti-inflationary  effect  of central  bank  independence  will
be unchanged  while  the effectiveness  of exchange  rate  pegs  will  be significantly  enhanced.
Cross-country  tests  using  newly  developed  data  provide  strong  support  for both our
institutional  and  our informational  propositions.References
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